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TEACHING NEGOTIATORS TO ANALYZE
CONFLICT STRUCTURE AND ANTICIPATE
THE CONSEQUENCES OF PRINCIPAL-
AGENT RELATIONSHIPS
JAYNE SEMINARE DOCHERTY* & MARCIA CATON CAMPBELL**
This essay assumes that becoming a creative, reflective practitioner of
negotiation requires more than mastering negotiation techniques or strategies.
It may be possible-but we think highly unlikely-that a professional
negotiator will not encounter negotiation situations where the parties differ in
type--e.g., an individual negotiating with a corporation or a corporation
negotiating with a local community group. It is also highly unlikely that a
professional negotiator will never encounter a situation where back table
negotiations between the principal party and the agent representing that party
disrupt the primary negotiation. There is no way to equip students with a set
of discrete skills for managing these kinds of challenges. Instead, they need to
learn to understand the structure of the negotiations and the structure of the
conflicts being addressed by negotiations. This essay offers some tools for
analyzing both the conflict and the negotiation process when it involves
agents negotiating on behalf of others.
Negotiation courses usually focus primary attention on the interactions
among the parties involved in the actual negotiation. Such courses also tend
to either isolate the negotiation process from the social context within which it
is embedded, or assume that students need only know about one small piece
of the social context (e.g., the legal system or the business world). Students of
negotiation should be encouraged to step back from the negotiation process
and think more broadly about the social context within which they are
operating. To this end, it is useful to consider how the structure of the larger
social conflict' or social problem affects the negotiation process. What do we
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1. Some students of negotiation will protest that they are not dealing with conflicts; they are
helping people address problems or differences. This may be true. In some settings we are not
talking about using negotiation to address deeply embedded, intractable social conflicts. On the
other hand, the difference between a conflict and a dispute or "mere problem" can be quite small; it is
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mean by "social context" and "structure of the larger social conflict?"
Negotiation is a process for managing or resolving conflicts that emerge in
a particular social context. For example, a negotiation may take place in a
corporate setting, in a family, in the legal system, or in a community setting.
In each of these cases, the context or setting of the conflict carries certain
norms, rules, and expectations-some formal and some informal-about how
a negotiation process will be managed. Who needs to be at the table? What
kinds of issues are negotiable and what kinds of issues are not even allowed to
be raised in negotiation? How will the parties comport themselves during the
negotiation?
Every social conflict, no matter the context within which it emerges, can
also be said to have a structure. Conflict structure includes the number of
parties involved. Is this a two-party conflict or a multi-party conflict?
Structure also includes the nature of the parties. Are the parties in the conflict
individuals or corporate entities? If corporate entities, are they tightly or
loosely organized? The number of parties and their nature are only two
aspects of conflict structure, but we can use them to illustrate why negotiators
should learn to think about the relationship between the structure of a conflict
and the negotiation process.
Negotiation is defined as an interactive communication process by
which two or more parties who lack identical interests attempt to find
a way to coordinate their behavior or allocate scarce resources in a
way that will make them better off than they could be if they were to
act alone.3
This definition of negotiation references the basic elements of
negotiation-parties, issues, goals, and interactions. Like many commonly
used definitions of negotiation, it does not address the context of the
negotiation encounter, but it is a useful place to start.
a matter of the perceptions of the parties, and it is useful for all students of negotiation to understand
the way the nature of the conflict-including its relative intensity-impacts a negotiation process.
2. The structure of a conflict should not be confused with the structure of negotiation, as
described by Korobkin, which is also an important issue to be considered in educating negotiators.
RUSSELL KOROBKIN, NEGOTIATION THEORY AND STRATEGY 33-220 (2002). When we talk about
the structure of a conflict, we are referring to features of the conflict such as the number and nature of
the parties and the quality of their relationships. This contrasts with the dynamics of a conflict,
which looks at changes in the parties' relationships and interactions over time. Think of the
"structure of a conflict" as a still photograph of the actors and their relationships taken at a given
moment and the "dynamics of a conflict" as a film of their interactions. The structure of a conflict
can change as a conflict progresses, so structural analysis needs to be done in an iterative manner.
3. Id. at 1.
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When thinking about a negotiation process in the abstract-negotiation as
an ideal type-we usually think of two parties even though we know that real
life often presents us with multi-party negotiations. We are also inclined to
think of parties as negotiating on their own behalf. Again, in real life, we
know that parties may be represented by others who negotiate on their behalf.
In some contexts, particularly when working with multi-party, community-
level negotiations, professionals talk about parties and their representatives.
In other settings, particularly law or business, the literature refers to the
parties as principals and their representatives as agents. This essay will use
the terms interchangeably.
Because negotiation is a process driven by communication, any increase
in the number of persons involved-adding more parties or involving agents
acting on behalf of principals-complicates the process. We all know what
happens in the game of telephone: the more a message gets passed around, the
more likely it is to be distorted. When messages must go from principal A to
agent A, from agent A to agent B, from agent B to principal B and back again,
we have more places where messages can get distorted. If we throw in
principal C and agent C, or even more parties and their agents, the
communication problems become daunting indeed. Figure 1 diagrams a
relatively simple negotiation with two parties represented by agents.4




4. This diagram and many of the ideas in this essay were greatly enriched by Jayne Seminare
Docherty's conversations with Ron Kraybill (Eastern Mennonite University), Frank Blechman
(independent consultant), and Carol Gowler, whose unpublished thesis examines the back table
negotiations in a conflict between an ethnic minority group and a military regime.
2004]
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When teaching students the art of negotiating on behalf of others, we can
focus on the problems that might arise between agents and principals and give
the students skills to prevent or overcome those problems. Thus, noting that
an agent who does not understand her client's interests and positions might
miss opportunities for an integrative agreement, we can make our students
practice interviewing skills that will help them uncover the client's interests.
Noting the serious problem of poor communication between principal and
agent, we can teach active listening, clear presentation, and other
communication techniques. Similarly, recognizing that the interests of the
agent and the principal sometimes differ, we can familiarize students with the
ethical and professional standards regulating their relationships with clients.
5
These are all valid parts of a good negotiation curriculum, but they are not
enough to develop highly skilled, reflective practitioners of negotiation.
Students also need to learn that introducing principal-agent relationships into
a negotiation establishes a set of interconnected negotiations. Principal A and
agent A have a set of "back table negotiations" and so do principal B and
agent B. The negotiations at the table intersect with and impact the
negotiations behind the table and vice versa. Put another way, conflicts
between principals and their agents impact the conflicts between the parties to
the central conflict and vice versa.
Sometimes agents and their principals use this structure of interconnected
negotiations for strategic purposes. Parties can buy time in the primary
negotiation by dragging out their back table negotiations. The agent can also
use an absent principal as an excuse for taking actions ("my client made me
say this") or declining offers from the other party ("I'm sorry, but my client
won't let me accept this offer."). On the other hand, there are times when
problems with the behind the table negotiations actually jeopardize the central
negotiation. Highly skilled negotiators need to understand why this happens
and how they can work with these problems.
The back table negotiations are difficult enough when the agent is
representing a single individual (say, one spouse in a divorce negotiation).
They become extremely complicated when the parties are collective entities
(say, corporations, community groups, warring militias, or unions). Yet,
efficiency and cost-saving concerns dictate that most negotiations involving
collective entities are carried out through representatives.
This is one place it really pays to understand the structure of the larger
conflict, because structural factors help determine just how difficult the back
table negotiations are likely to become. We have already alluded to the
5. For attorneys, this would include a working knowledge of, among other things, THE MODEL
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT (2004).
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regulatory mechanisms that govern (more or less formally) some principal-
agent relationships. However, in many cases these controls do not exist
because representatives of parties are selected through political processes.
Their roles as agents in a negotiation are socially and politically negotiated, as
is the evaluation of their performance, their ability to continue in the role of
agent for a sustained period, and their ability to deliver on any negotiated
agreements.
For example, in the case described in What's in a Frame?6 in this volume,
we might convene a multi-party negotiation involving a coalition of five
Native American tribes, elected officials from the city and adjacent counties,
developers, a variety of activist groups (including environmentalists, Native
American rights groups, and growth management groups), the state's
Congressional delegation, and a large federal agency. Obviously, these
parties will need to send representatives to negotiate on their behalf, and the
negotiation process will need to be designed to accommodate multiple back
table negotiations. In a case this complicated, a facilitator or mediator may be
hired to help manage the negotiation. However, good negotiators should not
rely solely on a facilitator or mediator to help them navigate a complex, multi-
party negotiation process. Party representatives can be far more effective if
they understand why back table negotiations are so important and why those
negotiations might stymie the primary negotiation.
Two structural factors can increase or decrease the possibility that
conflicts between parties and their representatives will negatively affect the
main negotiation. Negotiators should learn to ask the following questions
about each representative in a negotiation:
* How formal and structured is the relationship between the
principal and the agent?
* How much legitimacy does the agent have?
Some principal-agent relationships are contractual and regulated. An
agent is hired to negotiate on behalf of party A. Party A may fire the agent at
will, and may also be able to hold the agent accountable for his performance
according to the contractual agreement. Party A may also be able to file a
complaint against the agent with a professional body and/or sue the agent.
For his part, the agent may resign as a representative for party A and may
have rights to sue if party A fails to meet contractual obligations. The
relationship is professional, not personal; it is contractual, not political. In
other words, it is formal and highly structured.
In other cases, however, representatives may be selected through a variety
6. Marcia Caton Campbell & Jayne Seminare Docherty, What's in a Frame? (That Which We
Call a Rose by Any Other Name WouldSmell As Sweet), 87 MARQ. L. REv. 769 (2004).
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of political processes ranging in formality from voting to volunteering. A
union representative is elected. She must keep a close eye on her constituency
lest she not be re-elected, and there are formal mechanisms for recalling her if
the rank-and-file members feel that she is not representing their interests.
This is a formal and structured process, but it is messier than a contractual
relationship. Even less formal and structured are relationships between
parties and representatives when the parties are loose coalitions or voluntary
membership groups. In these cases, representatives often volunteer to speak
for the group or they may be selected based on their personal charisma. If the
group is informal and voluntary, the membership of the group may be subject
to fluctuations so that the representative may have difficulty presenting a
coherent position. Furthermore, there are few if any formal mechanisms for
the group to remove a volunteer from the negotiation table.
This leads to the problem of reliability. Can any given agent "deliver" on
a negotiated agreement? How accurately is any given agent representing the
interests and positions of the parties? Will the back table negotiations-which
may take the form of a vote in the case of a union or may be a lot messier and
more difficult to track in the case of ad-hoc voluntary organizations-support
the agreement reached at the negotiation table? It is usually, but not always,
safe to assume that an agent representing a party through a contractual
relationship has checked carefully with the party before affirming any
agreement. In more political relationships between a party and its
representative, it is much harder to predict whether the back table negotiations
will support the agreements reached at the main negotiation table.
The more political a relationship is between representative and party, the
more others involved in the negotiation need to focus on the question of
legitimacy. Legitimacy enters into a negotiation at several points. Each
person involved in the negotiation must be seen as a legitimate negotiating
partner by the other negotiators, otherwise negotiations cannot proceed. In
the case of agents negotiating on behalf of principals, there is an added
legitimacy question: Does Party A accept the agent representing Party A at the
table as a valid representative? Thus, looking at a multi-party negotiation
involving representatives of larger parties we can ask: How legitimate is any
given representative at any given moment?
Legitimacy or the lack thereof may be related to the way the agent was
chosen. If in the case described above the Bureau of Indian Affairs appoints
representatives for the coalition of five tribes, those representatives will
probably have low legitimacy. They may even need to take much more hard-
line positions in the negotiation to compensate for their "tainted"
appointment. That does not mean we can assume the tribal representatives
will have high legitimacy if they are selected from within. Internal conflicts
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within and among the tribes may distort the selection process. Furthermore,
the legitimacy of any representative may change over time and it may be
affected by the negotiation process. An agent may gain legitimacy by
succeeding in the negotiation or lose legitimacy by failing.
Taken together, the formality of the agent-principal relationship and the
agent's legitimacy with the party help determine whether agent-principal
conflicts (problems with the back table negotiations) are more or less likely to
disrupt inter-party negotiations. We can use the formality/informality
continuum and the low legitimacy/high legitimacy continuum to create a
model that illustrates the likelihood that conflicts between a party and its
representative will derail a negotiation (Figure 2).
FIGURE 2: LEGITIMACY AND FORMALITY OF PRINCIPAL-AGENT
RELATIONSHIP
Formal Regulation of Agent-Principal
Relationship
Unstable Agent-Principal
relationship but subject to regulation




from unstable to chaotic




regulation possible but not needed
Disruption of negotiation unlikely
High Legitimacy
of Agent
Agent-Principal relationship is stable
but subject to changes in political/
social context
Disruption of negotiation depends on
political developments in the party
III




In addition to the legitimacy of other representatives and the formality of
their relationships with their respective parties, good negotiators should have
some understanding of the way the nature of the party impacts their back
table negotiations. Some parties can move quickly, while others need
significantly more time to validate or reject proposed agreements. This is not
always a stalling tactic; it may be an honest reflection of the complexity of the
party's internal organization or a reflection of the party's culture.
For example, non-native representatives will probably see a Native
American representative in our case as potentially able to deliver constituents,
but the tribal representative will almost always disavow the ability to speak
for anyone but himself as an individual. It is common to hear tribal
representatives say something like, "I represent the X people, but I speak only
for myself." A tribal representative's ability to deliver constituents depends
on extensive and lengthy back table discussions with tribal members, some of
which can take months. This is something that non-native negotiators have
great difficulty with since temporal efficiency is a hallmark of good
negotiations in the business, legal, and administrative worlds.
Developing a table such as the following can help a negotiator pay
attention to the structural factors that shape back table negotiations between a
representative and his party. A blank version of this chart can be filled in for
a particular case. The negotiator should always remember to map her own
party on this diagram so that she examines the structural factors that are
shaping her own back table negotiation.
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Type of Party Nature of Structure Speed with which it Coherence of goals
can act
Corporation Highly organized Quickly-once the Very coherent-
Hierarchical necessary component clear, widely shared
parts become involved standards for
measuring success
(i.e., bottom line)
Government Agency Hierarchical Slowly compared to May be confused by
Organized, but may have corporations competing
some incoherence in the Quickly compared to mandates and
system because of community shifting political
competing mandates and organizations and scene
the influence of political other political groups
actors on policies and
Standard Operating
Procedures
Community Semi-structured Relatively slowly- May not be fully
Organization-e.g., Democratic and therefore needs time to build coherent and may
Neighborhood open to change consensus through lack shared
Association democratic processes standards for
measuring success
Native American Tribe Frequently subject to May be very slow, May be difficult to
internal conflicts between particularly if tribe discern because of
"progressive" and works by consensus internal conflicts
"traditional" factions and deliberation
Culturally more likely to
work by consensus rather
than majority vote
There are many negotiations that do not require the level of analysis
outlined in this essay. However, when faced with a complex negotiation
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involving different types of parties using representatives, looking at the
structure of the larger conflict and the nature of the parties can be a very
helpful process. It assists a negotiator in setting realistic expectations about
such basic factors as how long a negotiation will probably take and the
likelihood of ratification of an agreement reached at the primary negotiation
table. A negotiator who understands the pressures and opportunities created
by a counterpart's back table negotiations can also craft more creative
proposals by incorporating the needs and interests of the agent and her
principals into an agreement.
